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REGULATING CLAIMS TRADING IN
CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCIES: A PROPOSAL
FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
INTRODUCTION
The increase in bankruptcy filings during the 1980s awak-
ened a slumbering market. The fallout from the highly lever-
aged, debt-driven mergers and acquisitions of the 1980s
breathed new life into the field of bankruptcy. This revitaliza-
tion is most apparent in the recent rise in the trading of bank-
ruptcy claims.1 Trading in claims of bankrupt concerns has
proven to be a lucrative, multi-billion dollar market.2
Claims trading benefits everyone involved. It provides
investors with a new source of investment, creditors with a
liquid market for their claims, and debtors with interested and
motivated parties to help them through the reorganization pro-
cess.3 Moreover, the concentration of claims that often results
from claims trading reduces transaction costs and accelerates
the bankruptcy process.4
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19785
("Bankruptcy Code") does not offer clear guidance on the role of
courts in the claims trading market.6 The resulting inconsis-
1 Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1990) [herein-
after Trading Claims]. Indeed, some have predicted that the bull market for
claims trading may become the leveraged buyouts of the 90s. See, e.g., Sandra
E. Mayerson et al., Trading Claims: The New Bankruptcy Game, Any Number
Can Play, in BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS FOR WORKOUT OFFICERS AND
LENDERS COUNSEL 1991, at 547 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 587, 1991); see also Herbert P. Minkel, Jr., & Cynthia A. Baker,
Claims and Control in Chapter 11 Cases: A Call for Neutrality, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 35 (1991) (stating that the debate over claims trading has been fueled
by the growth of the market for claims).
2 See Mayerson et al., supra note 1, at 539, 547 (citing Alison Leigh Cowan,
Bottom Fishing With R.D. Smith, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at D1 (selling
bad debt has become a $318 billion dollar opportunity)); Matthew Schifrin,
Sellers Beware, FORBES, Jan. 12, 1991, at 36 (estimating market for defaulted,
unsecured debt, and trade claims at $100 billion).
s See Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 4.
41d. at 6.
5 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
6 The Bankruptcy Code does not address claims trading, in part because
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tent rulings and controversy among practitioners have further
confused the court's role in claims trading.7 Much of the com-
mentary on claims trading attempts to help practitioners deal
with this uncertainty.'
the claims trading market was small enough to be virtually ignored when
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Mayerson et al., supra
note 1, at 561. Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e), promulgated in 1991 under the au-
thority of the Bankruptcy Act, deals with claims trading expressly. See 11
U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) (Supp. IV 1992). As discussed infra in Part III.B,
this rule fails to address the process adequately.
' Commentary on claims trading has been both positive and negative. See
Gordon Caplan, Post-Petition Trading in Chapter 11 Claims: A Call for
Augmentation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(2), 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1053 (1990) (arguing in favor of adding a disclosure require-
ment to Rule 3001(e)); Joy Flowers Conti et al., Claims Trafficking in Chapter
11 -Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 281, 298 (1992)
(arguing in favor of requiring disclosure and active monitoring of claims
trading by the courts); Jeffrey S. Sabin et al., Trading in Claims and Taking
Control of the Chapter 11 Debtor: Allegheny Revisited, in TRADING IN CLAIMS
AGAINST CHAPTER 11 DEBTORS: INVESTMENT AND CONTROL ISSUES 181 (PLI
Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 569, 1991) (arguing that some
regulation is required, but taking control of a debtor through claims trading
should not be presumed to be bad faith); Trading Claims, supra note 1
(favoring increased regulation). But see Andrew Africk, Note, Trading in
Claims in Chapter 11: How Much Influence Can Be Purchased in Good Faith
Under Section 1126?, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1393 (1991) (calling for a presump-
tion of good faith on the part of claims purchasers).
8 See generally Scott K. Charles, Trading Claims in Chapter 11 Cases:
Legal Issues Confronting the Postpetition Investor, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 261
(discussing the legal issues faced by claims traders, including applicability of
securities and tax laws, valuation of claims, and the mechanics of claims
trading); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Developments in Trading
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 13 CAIDOzO
L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Taking Control] (discussing acquisition of a
debtor through claims trading under the amended Rule 3001(e)); Chaim J.
Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, 1992 Developments In Trading Claims:
Participations and Disputed Claims, in 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 475 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
793, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Developments] (examining the amended Rule
3001(e) and the effects of claims trading on NOLs); David G. Heiman et al.,
Acquisition of Interests in Chapter 11 Debtors, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS
REORGANIZATIONS 1993 291 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 647, 1993) (discussing the mechanics of claims trading in Chapter 11);
Michael S. Lurey & Thomas A. Ryan, Issues in Trading Claims in Chapter 11
Cases, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
1991, at 745 (PLI Com. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 573,
1991) (discussing the current legal ramifications of attempting to gain control
of a debtor through claims trading); Mayerson et al., supra note 1 (discussing
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Part I of this Note presents a brief overview of the bank-
ruptcy process in the United States, for it is within this frame-
work that claims trading occurs. Part II explains why parties
engage in claims trading and some practical requirements
limiting their ability to do so. Part III reviews court-created re-
quirements for claims trading as well as those imposed by the
Bankruptcy Code and rules promulgated under its authority.
Part IV examines the applicability of securities laws to the
claims trading process. Part V argues that the lack of guidance
under the current Bankruptcy Code causes uncertainty in the
business community, stifling the market and increasing transac-
tion costs. This Note concludes that investors would be better
able to plan and engage in claims trading if the Bankruptcy
Code required disclosure by claims traders.
I. BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. ORIGIN
The idea of bankruptcy originated in Roman law.9 Bank-
ruptcy proceedings as we know them today, however, began to
develop during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.'0 The
the mechanics and strategic uses of claims trading); James E. Milistein &
Shari Siegel, Strategic Investments and Acquisitions in the Chapter 11 Context,
in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 353 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 754, 1991) (reviewing methods of gaining
equity in companies currently in Chapter 11); Minkel & Baker, supra note 1;
Sally S. Neely, Investing in Troubled Companies and Trading in Claims and
Interests in Chapter 11 Cases -A Brave New World, in COURSE OF STUDY -
FUNDAMENTALS OF CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 109 (C836 ALI-
ABA) (1993) (exploring how courts apply bankruptcy rules to claims trading);
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992); Trading Claims, supra note
1; C. Kenneth White, Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: Trends, Issues and
Investment Opportunities, in THE PROBLEMS OF INDENTURE TRUSTEES AND
BONDHOLDERS 1991: DEFAULTED BONDS AND BANKRUPTCY 11 (PLI Real
Estate L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 366, 1991) (discussing the
mechanics of claims trading, the tax issues involved in claims trading); Peter
D. Wolfson et al., Postpetition Trading of Claims and New Rule 3001(e), in
HIGH-YIELD BONDS 1991 RECENT TRENDS IN WORKOUTS, ExCHANGE OFFERS,
AND BANKRUPTCY 201 (PLI Real Estate L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 367, 1991) (discussing the inadequacies of the new Rule 3001(e)).
9 JAN H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY § 1.01, at 1-1 (6th ed. 1986).
10 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D
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framers of the United States Constitution noted the importance
of bankruptcy. James Madison wrote that a uniform bankrupt-
cy system is "is so intimately connected with the regulation of
commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or
their property may lie or be removed into different States, that
the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into ques-
tion.""
The need for and policies behind a federal bankruptcy
procedure remain true today. Bankruptcy law attempts to
ensure that all similarly situated creditors are treated equal-
ly.'2 More importantly, it protects the interests of creditors as
a group. 3 Without bankruptcy law, creditors would resort to
self-help measures to collect the debts owed to them. Each
creditor would act in its own best interest, in the process taking
or harming assets that would have accrued to other creditors. 4
Bankruptcy law attempts to minimize this harmful behavior
and to ensure that the value of the debtor's remaining assets is
maximized for all creditors. 5
Chapter 11 proceedings carry this concept a step further,
recognizing that it may be in the best interests of society in
general to allow the debtor to continue to operate, create a plan
of reorganization, restructure its existing debt, and start
"fresh."'6 Chapter 11 bankruptcy law reflects the belief that
the value of a business as a going concern may far exceed the
value of its assets sold individually and immediately. 7
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CHAPTER 11 IN THE UNITED STATES
Bankruptcy laws in the United States developed "from a
creditor-based, punitive model of debt proceedings to one which
§ 1:02, at 1-3 (1986).
11 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Willmoore Kendall &
George W. Carey eds., 1966).
12 See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990).
13 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
7-11 (1986).
14 See id. at 7-19.
5 Id. at 14. See also Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 775 (1987) (discussing the distributional rationales behind bankruptcy
policy).
"s JACKSON, supra note 13, at 225-52.
17 Id. at 14.
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is primarily an affirmative debtor's remedy... ."" This devel-
opment culminated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.19'
This Act consolidated several sections of the old Bankruptcy
Code2" and left separate provisions to govern liquidations,2'
municipal bankruptcies,22 corporate reorganizations, 3 farm
bankruptcies, 24 and individual bankruptcies.
25
A corporation may take two basic routes in a bankruptcy
proceeding. In a Chapter 7 proceeding the debtor's estate is
organized, all creditors present their claims to the court, and a
trustee is appointed to oversee the liquidation of the debtor's
estate. Once the estate has been liquidated, the trustee pays off
the creditors according to the claims presented. The second
form of bankruptcy proceeding, a Chapter 11 reorganization,
allows the debtor to pay off creditors as it continues to operate
and reorganize its business. In this way, Chapter 11 not only
promotes the interests of creditors as a group but also ensures
that similarly situated creditors are treated equally.
When a debtor files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the court.
enters an automatic stay, which prevents virtually all creditors
from collecting debts or enforcing judgments against the debt-
18 NORTON, supra note 10, § 1:3.
19 See id. § 2 (reviewing the development of bankruptcy law in the United
States and discussing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978); see also Theodore
Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1981)
(criticizing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and arguing that the Act
wrongly isolates the treatment of bankruptcy from the existing legal struc-
ture); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective: A Rejoinder, 30
UCLA L. REV. 617 (1983). But cf. Stefen L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore
Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327 (1982)
(stating that Eisenberg views the goals of bankruptcy law much more narrow-
ly than the drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act).
20 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code combines four separate chapters of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Which addressed the reorganization of businesses:
Chapter VIII which concerned railroads; Chapter X which covered corporate
reorganizations; Chapter XI which concerned the arrangement of unsecured
debts by corporations, partnerships, and individuals; and Chapter XII which
dealt with non-corporate debtors who owned encumbered real estate. PATRICK
A. MURPHY, CREDIToRs' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 1.04 (1987).
21 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
2 Id. §§ 901-946.
23 Id. §§ 1101-1174.
24 Id. §§ 1201-1231.
2 Id. §§ 1301-1330.
1994] 307
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or.2 ' All creditors who want to participate in the bankruptcy
must then present their claims to the bankruptcy court.
21
Chapter 11 permits the debtor to remain in control and operate
the business,28 unless the court orders the appointment of a
trustee.29 If the debtor remains in control, it has an exclusive
right to file the plan of reorganization, provided that it does so
within 120 days.3"
If the court confirms it, 3 the reorganization plan governs
the entire bankrupcy process. It describes how all outstanding
debts will be satisfied, when and how much creditors will be
paid, and the rights of all classes of creditors.32 The percent of
recovery provided to each class determines the value of the
claims of all of creditors in that class. Creditors use the amount
they believe they will recover under the plan in determining
whether and at what price they will trade their claims.
26 See id. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
27 See id. § 507.
' A debtor who remains in control during the bankruptcy proceeding is
referred to as a debtor-in-possession.
29 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988). Section 1104 requires the appointment of a
trustee if there is fraud, dishonesty, mismanagement or incompetence, or if
the appointment of the trustee is in the "interests of creditors." Id.
30 Id. § 1121(b).
31 See id. § 1126. Confirmation of a plan requires that two thirds of the
dollar amount of each class of claims and one half of the claim holders for each
class accept the plan. Id. § 1126(c). A court will confirm a reorganization plan
only if the reorganization meets the best interest of creditors test: the debtor
must show that each creditor-in an impaired class will receive at least as
much property under the reorganization plan as it would receive in a liquida-
tion. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
32 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988). In bankruptcy, creditors' claims are divided
into separate categories known as classes. Each class contains similar claims.
Id. § 1122. For example, there will be separate classes for claims that
represent creditors whose debts are fully secured, partially secured, and unse-
cured. Further classes may be created for additional types of claims. See
BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. REsNIcK, BANKRUPTCY LAw MANUAL
I 8.19[2][a], at 8-104 (3d ed. 1993).
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II. BACKGROUND ON CLAIMS TRADING
A. WHY TRADE CLAIMS?
When a company declares Chapter 11 bankruptcy, any
creditor33 who wishes to participate in the bankruptcy must
file a notice of claim. 4 A claim establishes the creditor's right
against the debtor and allows the creditor to participate in the
bankruptcy. 5 Instead of waiting for confirmation of the reor-
ganization plan to determine the value of the claim and autho-
rize its payment, however, the creditor may choose to sell its
claim to a third party. The third party investor steps into the
shoes of the creditor and obtains whatever rights the creditor
has against the debtor.36 The buyer of this claim may, in turn,
choose to resell the claim to another purchaser.
Claims trading serves an important purpose by creating a
liquid market for the claims of a bankrupt entity. Some credi-
tors prefer immediate cash over the delay and uncertainty of a
reorganization. Creditors can control the timing of the gain or
loss by choosing when to sell the claim. 7  Others, such as
3 A creditor is any entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor, has a communi-
ty claim, or has a claim arising out of one of several specified instances. 11
U.S.C. § 101(10) (1988).
"4 The Bankruptcy Act defines a claim as follows: "(A) right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right of payment .... 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5) (1988).
Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the filing of proofs of claims
or interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). Allowance of claims or interests is
governed by § 502. See id. § 502.
35 A creditor may or may not wish to participate in the bankruptcy
reorganization process. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy is time consuming and
creates uncertainty as to how much, if any, of the claim will eventually be
paid. In 1989 for example, fumds investing in claims of bankrupt entities had
returns ranging from a 34% gain to a 40% loss. See White, supra note 8, at
14.
" In re Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1942). Due to
the'potential for defects, a claims purchaser should obtain some represen-
tations and warranties as to the validity of the claim.
17 Id. The gain or loss will be determined by whether the claim is sold
above or below its book value, which may have been written down when the
debtor declared bankruptcy.
1994] 309
310 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.3:303
trade creditors, simply hope to recoup their losses through
future dealings with the newly reorganized entity.35 Claims
trading also allows creditors to sell claims in order to gain tax
or other advantages.39 For example, selling claims may help a
bank to remove nonperforming loans, which adversely affect the
bank's capital requirements.4" A creditor who holds a large
claim (or a claim that is partially disputed) can split its claim
and sell part of it if it is economically advantageous.4
Furthermore, an active claims trading market may encour-
age the extension of credit. A creditor will be more likely to
extend credit to a risky customer if the creditor knows that an
active market exists where the creditor can receive cash for its
claims in the event of bankruptcy. An active claims market
may also benefit less risky customers by encouraging creditors
to provide more favorable terms or increased credit to them.
1. Claims Trading as an Investment Tool
The secondary market for trading bankrutpcy claims has
become a major market in which all of the large Wall Street
money centers participate.42 Investors treat claims like stocks
and other high-risk, high-yield investments.43 In addition,
they provide interested investors with an opportunity to become
involved in the bankruptcy reorganization process. Claims
investors accelerate the bankruptcy process because they are
frequently more sophisticated and profit-oriented than many
other creditors." Although these investors primarily seek
38 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 5. Creditors may wish to avoid
assuming an adversarial role against a debtor with whom they hope to have
an ongoing relationship. Heiman et al., supra note 8, at 297.
" Heiman et al., supra note 8.
41 Mayerson et al., supra note 1, at 571.
4' 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 512. The disputed portion of a
claim may be worth more to the original creditor than to third parties because
the original creditor has more familiarity with the account.
42 " he game of the '90s is as a creditor, not a shareholder."' Ken Kohn,
The Next Wave? First Boston Proposes Buying Bonds as a Takeover Tech-
nique, CORPORATE FINANCING WK., March 28, 1988, at 1 (quoting John Laeri,
Managing Director of First Boston).
13 Id. For example, "vulture" funds have recently developed to specifically
allow investment in the claims market. Mayerson et al., supra note 1.
4' See Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 6.
1994]
profit, not control, they may try to influence the reorganization
plan if doing so will increase the yield of their investments.
2. Claims Trading as a Means to Control
Trading claims to gain control of debtors through the
purchase of debt at deep discounts is more controversial and
potentially harmful than claims trading for investment purpos-
es.45 The interested party not only obtains control of the
company at a significant discount, but it also bypasses many of
the securities laws designed specifically to regulate bids for
control of corporations.4"
Buying claims differs from buying stock in the debtor
because the claims holder exerts negative control rather than
positive control. By purchasing a large enough block of any
class of claims, a claims holder can obtain a "blocking position,"
enabling it to stop the confirmation of any reorganization
plan.47 The claims purchaser, therefore, can extract more
favorable treatment for its class of claims by blocking any
unfavorable plan. The claims purchaser may also be able to
acquire enough claims to approve a favorable reorganization
plan independently.
Past court intervention48 demonstrates that the investor
acquiring claims as a means to control must be wary of several
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. Acquiring claims with the
intention of blocking could be viewed as an action in bad faith
in violation of § 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code.49 Also, some
courts analogize the purchase of claims to the solicitation of
See David C.L. Frauman & Stephen J. Blauner, Bankrupt Entities
Targeted: Trading Claims Can Serve as the Basis of a Takeover, N.Y. L.J.,
June 4, 1990, at 5.
"' As discussed infra in Part IV, a claim not based on a security is not
considered a security under the Securities Act of 1933, and therefore buying
claims does not trigger the reporting requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
"' The Bankruptcy Code requires acceptance'by two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the allowed claims for the court to approve
the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988). Thus a claims purchaser can block a
plan of reorganization by purchasing one-third of the claims in any one class.
48 Cases involving court intervention are discussed infra Part III.
4 Africk, supra note 7, at 1395; see 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988).
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votes and therefore consider it subject to § 1125(b)'s require-
ment of written disclosure.50
B. LIMITATIONS ON CLAIMS TRADING IN BANKRUPTCY
1. Net Operating Losses
Although there are several possible ways that a claim in
bankruptcy may be limited,"' the Bankruptcy Code does not
address claims trading. Case law, however, imposes several
limitations on claims trading. One important example is the
possibility that the debtor may lose its net operating loss
("NOL") carryforward52 because of claims trading. If a debtor
is at risk of losing its NOL, the court may limit the claim or not
recognize the transfer.
Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits the use of
NOL carryforwards when there has been a transaction or a
series of transactions which result in an ownership change of
fifty percent or more of the corporation's stock over a three year
period.5 3 Purchase of claims by post-petition investors can
50 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988); see In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282,
292 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
51 Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code addresses the allowance of claims or
interests in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). It lists several limitations on
the amount of claims and provides the procedure for determining the amount
of the allowable claim. Id.
52 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 111. If a business loses money in a
given year, it has an NOL. An NOL carryforward allows a business that is
currently making a profit, but has past NOLs, to reduce its current taxes by
deducting its past NOLs. See 26 U.S.C. § 382 (1988).
53 26 U.S.C. § 382 (1988); see Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 111.
Section 382()(5) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a special exemption for
Chapter 11 reorganizations. 26 U.S.C. § 382(l)(5) (1988). Under this provi-
sion, the IRS looks at claims of both stockholders and debtholders when
determining whether the ownership of the debtor has changed. A debtor who
is in bankruptcy can retain at least part of its NOL if, after claims trading,
the original shareholders and creditors of the corporation still end up with at
least 50% of the stock of the debtor. White, supra note 8, at 32-33; Trading
Claims, supra note 1, at 112-13.
The Internal Revenue Service alleviates the impact of this rule on small
creditors by defining a creditor as any holder of a beneficial interest in less
than 5% of a class of a debtor's bonds or debentures, regardless of when such
holder acquired its beneficial interest. 26 U.S.C. §§ 382(g)(1)-(2), (k)(7) (1988).
Thus a claims purchaser will be considered an original creditor for purposes
of the 50% test so long as their interest does not exceed 5% of a class of a
REGULATING CLAIMS TRADING
pose a serious risk that, because the corporation's debts now
have new owners, the corporation will not meet the § 382
requirements and will lose some or all of its NOL. The loss of
its NOL can be a major concern to the debtor.
Because the debtor has no control over claims trading by
creditors, the debtor cannot prevent the change in ownership
and resulting loss of NOLs caused by claims trading.54 There
has been a recent trend of debtors attempting to control or block
claims trading in order to preserve their NOLs.55 Two recent
examples of this are the Ames Depariment Store and Pan Am
Airlines bankruptcies." In Ames, the court, at the request of
the debtor, ordered creditors to stop trading claims; in Pan Am
the court allowed the debtor to regulate claims trading itself."
In both cases, the courts relied on the Second Circuit's
holding in Prudential Lines" as authority for their actions.59
In Prudential Lines, the court viewed the debtor's NOL as
property of the estate and issued an injunction to prevent the
debtor's parent company from taking action which would extin-
guish the NOL carryforward." Prudential Lines provides an
interesting example of how a court can use its general equitable
powers under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code in combination with
some other code provision to step in and regulate claims trading
activity. The potential for this type of court action causes
uncertainty and unrest in the claims trading market.
debtor's bonds or debentures. This provision allows some existing creditors to
sell their claims without adversely affecting the debtor's NOL.
" See Sandra E. Mayerson, Debtors, Creditors Vie on Claims Trading,
NAT'L L. J., Mar. 30, 1992, at 16.
" See 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 509 (discussing the Pan Am and
Ames Department Store bankruptcies). The Pan Am and Ames decisions are
both unreported.
5 Id.
5 Id. at 516-17. In both cases, creditors and claims buyers did not object
to the debtor's request for limits on claims trading. Id.
' In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 82 (1991).
'9 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 518.
60 The Second Circuit held that the NOL was property of the estate and
that the court had the power to enjoin the parent from taking such action
under both the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision (§ 362(a)) and its
general equitable powers (§ 105). Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 572-74; 11
U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 105 (1988).
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Both Ames and Pan Am were successful in part because
creditors did not strongly oppose the courts' limitations on
claims trading.61 A court facing opposition from creditors
might not be as willing to restrict claims trading. The statutory
authority for the courts' actions against claims trading is far
from clear.62 Aside from Ames and Pan Am, there are no
known cases of a court using NOL considerations as the basis
for limiting claims trading.
63
These cases show that courts are willing to use other code
provisions to limit claims trading activity when they deem it
necessary. Under the current Rule 3001(e), bankruptcy courts
may be more prone to reach out to § 105 to correct perceived
abuses in the claims trading process. The disclosure proposal
described in Part V of this Note would prevent much of the
uncertainty that now surrounds claims trading.
2. Trading by Fiduciaries
Another constraint on claims trading is the possibility that
courts will not recognize all or part of a claim because the
purchaser of is also a fiduciary.' In this situation, there are
two classes of fiduciaries: the first are the classic "insiders,"
such as officers and directors;65 the second are members of
61 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 516-17. In Ames, the objecting
claims buyers settled. Id. In Pan Am, that Pan Am was headed for liquida-
tion meant that there were few potential buyers of claims to protest. Id.
62 See id. Fortgang and Mayer question the application of Prudential Lines
to claims trading. They argue that Prudential Lines involved a willful attempt
by the parent to destroy the debtor's NOLs, while claims traders generally
have no idea what the impact of trading claims would be on the debtor's
NOLs. Fortgang and Mayer believe that court-imposed restraints on claims
trading may unduly infringe on individuals' rights to freely alienate their
property. 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 519.
' There are, however, interesting examples of debtors taking action to
protect their NOLs. For example, Munsingwear, Inc. published a notice in the
Wall Street Journal, stating that they would sue any claims buyer for violat-
ing the automatic stay. WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at Bl (legal notice).
' See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 310 (1949)
(fiduciaries who trade in claims may have their claims rejected in whole or in
part if honoring the claim "would not be fair or equitable to other creditors.");
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308-09 (1939).
' See Minkel & Baker, supra note 1, at 56. "Insiders" include officers and
directors of a corporation as well as persons in control of the debtor, partner-
ships in which the debtor is a general partner, general partners of the debtor,
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official creditor committees.66 Courts carefully scrutinize any
claims trading transactions by either of these groups. 7
In the Allegheny bankruptcy," the court expanded its
definition of an "insider" to include claims purchasers who put
forth a plan.69 However, the court's finding that a proponent
of a plan becomes an insider due to its position lacks support in
the Bankruptcy Code. ° This finding indicates the extent to
which courts will involve themselves when examining claims
trading.
One difficulty with strictly regulating claims trading by
fiduciaries is that some of the largest creditors are often asked
to sit on creditor committees. Large creditors are often very
important to the bankruptcy process and should be represented
on creditor committees. But these creditors may also want to
trade claims or at least reserve the right to trade claims should
the need arise. Some commentators would settle this dilemma
through the use of a fire wall.7 The fire wall would restrict
interaction between representatives of the creditor who have a
fiduciary duty to the debtor, and representatives of the fiduciary
who are engaged in claims trading.72
or a relative of any of the above. 11 U.S.C § 101(31)(B) (1988).
6 Minkel & Baker, supra note 1, at 56. Individuals are appointed to
official creditor committees under section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
67 See Minkel & Baker, supra note 1, at 58-64. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295 (1939) ("dominant or controlling stockholder" is a fiduciary); In
re Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1993); In re 604 Columbus Ave.
Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1336 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Marquam Inv. Corp.,
942 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (5th
Cir. 1991) (rigorous scrutiny where bankruptcy trustee seeks to subordinate "a
claim arising from the dealings between a debtor and an insider"); Barlow v.
Budge, 127 F.2d 440 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 647 (1942); In re Union
Meeting Partners, 160 B.R. 757 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); In re Harborview Dev.
1986 Ltd. Partnership, 152 B.R. 897 (D.S.C. 1993); In re Chas. P. Young Co.,
145 B.R. 131, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing In re Fabricators); In re
Daugherty Coal Co., 144 B.R. 320, 324 (N.D.W.V. 1992); In re E.F. Hutton
Southwest Properties II, Ltd., 103 B.R. 808 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re
Inter-Island Vessel Co., Inc., 98 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); In re Sleepy
Valley, Inc., 93 B.R. 925 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
' In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
69 Id. at 299.
70 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B) (1988).
71 See Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 35-36.
72 Id. The fire wall is recognized by the Securities Exchange Commission
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III. REGULATION OF CLAIMS TRADING
A. REGULATION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 AND
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Claims trading dates back to the Revolutionary War, when
the founding fathers attempted to buy the claims of the insol-
vent states for $0.25 on the dollar, while arranging to have the
debts assumed by the new federal government and paid in
full.73 Regulation of claims trading dates back to the begin-
ning of bankruptcy law in the United States. Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 expressly regulated claims trading. 4
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, however, does not include any provi-
sions regulating claims trading." It is unclear from the legis-
lative history whether this omission was intentional or a result
of oversight. Nor did the advisory committee consider the
importance of the Chapter X guidelines for claims trading when
it drafted the 1983 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 6
Members of the advisory committee and some commentators
assert that, because the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize
any regulation of claims trading, the courts have no power to pro-
mulgate rules, such as Rule 3001(e), to regulate it." Supreme
Court precedent predating the Bankruptcy Code, however,
favors court regulation of claims trading.7" According to some
for use in tender offers. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1990).
73 CLAUDE G. BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 43-48 (1925).
74 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 212, 249 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 612, 649
(1976)) (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1979).
71 Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 regulated claims trading in
order to protect the securities-trading public. In re Pleasant Hill Partners,
163 B.R. 388, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994). However, other chapters of the
1898 Act did not regulate claims trading "because Congress assumed that
trade creditors and bank creditors knew their debtor and needed less protec-
tion." Id.
76 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 13.
7' Barbara Franklin, Trading Creditors' Claims: Bar Challenges Bankrupt-
cy Courts' Role in Deals, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 1990, at 5 ("If there are to be any
restrictions on trading of claims or disclosure required, it should be written
into the Bankruptcy Code by Congress, said Alan M. Resnick," who served as
the reporter for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.); Conti et al.,
supra note 7, at 298.
" In re Pleasant Hill Partners, 163 B.R. 388, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994)
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courts, pre-Code precedent still applies because no evidence
exists that Congress, in writing the new Code, intended to
overturn it.7
9
B. BANKRUPTCY RULE 3001(e)
The 1983 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure included Rule
3001(e), which governs the transfer of claims in bankruptcy.
80
Prior to its amendment in 1991, Rule 3001(e) required not only
that parties transferring claims inform the court that a transfer
of claims was taking place, but also that they disclose the
consideration paid for the transferred claims.8 ' If, after a
(citing American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138
(1940)). In Avon Park, the Supreme Court set aside confirmation of a plan,
indicating that the court has control over the whole process of formulation and
approval of reorganization plans and that its control included scrutiny of
surrounding circumstances. Avon Park, 311 U.S. at 145-46.
7 9 Pleasant Hill, 163 B.R. at 391 n.3; see United Sav. Assoc. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988).
80 Section 3001(e)(1)-(2), as amended in 1991, provides:
(1) Transfer of Claim Other Than for Security Before Proof Filed.
If a claim has been transferred other than for security before proof
of the claim has been filed, the proof of claim may be filed only by
the transferee or an indenture trustee.
(2) Transfer of Claim Other Than for Security After Proof Filed. If
a claim other than one based on a publicly traded note, bond, or
debenture has been transferred other than for security after the
proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the terms of the transfer
shall be filed by the transferee. The clerk shall immediately notify
the alleged transferor by mail of the filing of the evidence of trans-
fer and that objection thereto, if any, must be filed with within 20
days of the mailing of the notice or within any additional time
allowed by the court. If the alleged transferor files a timely objec-
tion and the court finds, after notice and hearing, that the claim
has been transferred other than for security, it shall enter an order
substituting the transferee for the original transferor. If a timely
objection is not filed by the alleged transferor, the transferee shall
be substituted for the transferor.
11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1992). The United States
Supreme Court promulgates the Bankruptcy Rules pursuant to its statutory
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988).
81 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e)(1)-(2) (1988) (repealed Aug. 1, 1991). Before
the 1991 amendments, Rule 3001(e) provided as follows:
(1) Unconditional Transfer Before Proof Filed. If a claim other
than one based on a bond or debenture has been unconditionally
transferred before proof of the claim has been filed, the proof of
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hearing, the court determined that the claim was uncondition-
ally transferred, it could substitute the transferee for the trans-
feror in the bankruptcy proceeding.s2 At the same time, courts
could disapprove a transfer in situations where, for example, the
amount paid for claims was significantly lower than that provid-
ed in the reorganization plan." Indeed, the advisory com-
mittee notes to the Rule encouraged this court involvement:
[T]he interests of sound administration are served by
requiring the post-petition transferee to file with the
claim may be filed only by the transferee. If the claim has been
transferred after the filing of the petition, the proof of claim shall be
supported by (A) a statement of the transferor acknowledging the
transfer and stating the consideration therefore or (B) a statement
of the transferee setting forth the consideration for the transfer and
why the transferee is unable to obtain the statement from the
transferor.
(2) Unconditional Transfer After Proof Filed. If a claim other than
one based on a bond or debenture has been unconditionally trans-
ferred after the proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the terms
of the transfer shall be filed by the transferee. The clerk shall
immediately notify the original claimant by mail of the filing of the
evidence of the transfer and that objection thereto, if any, must be
filed with the clerk within 20 days of the mailing of the notice or
within any additional time allowed by the court. If the court finds,
after a hearing on notice, that the claim has been unconditionally
transferred, it shall enter and order substituting the transferee for




' See, e.g., In re Revere Copper and Brass, 58 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (refusing transfer where offer was for 20% of the face value of the claims
while the plan proposed 65%); see also In re Allegheny Int'l Inc., 100 B.R. 241
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (imposing additional procedures for claims trading in
addition to those in Rule 3001(e)); In re Odd Lot Trading, Inc., 115 B.R. 97,
101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (examining the adequacy of claims buyers'
3001(e) disclosure, but concluding that the disclosure, which included buyers'
predictions concerning the value of claims under the proposed plan and the re-
maining obstacles to approval of the plan, was sufficient).
Although the original version of Rule 3001(e)(2) simply required the court
to determine whether the transfer had occurred unconditionally, several
courts - including Revere Copper and Allegheny - interpreted the rule to
allow them to exceed their ministerial functions and regulate the transfer of
claims by requiring a certain level of disclosure. Courts tended to take this
activist role when they believed there was bad faith on the part of the claims
purchaser, or that informational advantages caused some other inequity.
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proof of claim a statement of the transferor acknowl-
edging the transfer and consideration for the transfer.
Such a disclosure will assist the court in dealing with
evils that may arise out of post-bankruptcy traffic in
claims against the estate. 4
By requiring evidence of the consideration paid for the
claim,85 the old Rule 3001(e) provided some meaningful disclo-
sure for claims trading. However, the resulting court interven-
tion chilled the claims trading market. One commentator de-
scribed the situation as as follows:
The problem with things now.., is that the amount
and type of disclosure ordered varies between judges.
The lack of uniformity has created uncertainty, chilling
the private market for claims and causing sellers, many
of whom are only interested in cashing out as quickly
as possible, to take greater losses than they otherwise
would.86
Rule 3001(e) was amended in 1991 to reduce court oversight
of claims trading.87 The current rule simply requires the
transferee to provide evidence of the transfer to the court. 8 If
the transferor does not object within 20 days of notification by
the clerk, the court substitutes the transferee for the transfer-
' 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) advisory committee's note (1988). Courts
used this advisory committee note as a basis for intervening in the claims
trading process. See, e.g., In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1, 2
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The old Rule 3001(e)(1) provided that
If the claim has been transferred after the filing of the petition, the
proof of claim shall be supported by (A) a statement of the transferor
acknowledging the transfer and stating the consideration therefore
or (B) a statement of the transferee setting forth the consideration for
the transfer and why the transferee is unable to obtain the state-
ment from the transferor.
11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e)(1) (1988) (repealed Aug. 1, 1991) (emphasis add-
ed).
"Franklin, supra note 77.
87 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) advisory committee's note (Supp. IV 1992);
Conti et al., supra note 7, at 298.
' 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
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or. 9 The advisory committee notes to the 1991 amendments
state that the purpose of the amended Rule is:
[T]o limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes
regarding transfers of claims. If a claim has been
transferred prior to the filing of a proof of claim, there
is no need to state the consideration for the transfer or
to submit other evidence of the transfer .... This rule is
not intended either to encourage or discourage post-
petition transfers of claims or to affect remedies other-
wise available under nonbankruptcy law to a transferor
or transferee such as for misrepresentation in connec-
tion with the transfer of a claim.90
The amended Rule limits court involvement in claims trading to
resolving disputes between transferors and transferees.9
Moreover, the language makes it clear that only the transferor
may object to a transfer.92 If no objection is timely filed, the
court is required to effect the transfer.93
One significant advantage of the amended rule is that it
may facilitate claims splitting.94 Unlike the current rule, the
former Rule 3001(e) required that transfers of claims be uncon-
ditional.95 The bankruptcy court in Ionosphere96 decided that
splitting a claim violated the old Rule 3001(e) because it placed
a condition on the transfer." The court feared that claims
89 Id.
9' 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) advisory committee's note (Supp. IV 1992)
(emphasis added). The change in this rule was subject to minimal public
debate or comment, with fewer than ten written comments delivered to the
committee. See Franklin, supra note 77, at 5.
91 Id. The Rule provides that "[i]f a timely objection is filed, the court's role
is to determine whether a transfer has been made that is enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law. Id.
92 Id.
9 See id. The full text of the rule appears supra note 80.
94 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 512.
9 See 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) (1988).
9 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. and Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 119 B.R. 440
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
9 Id. at 443 (stating that the primary objective of the requirement that
claims be unconditionally transferred is to enable the court to monitor claims
and protect against inequitable conduct).
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splitting would have two undesirable ends. First, it would
greatly increase the administrative burden on the debtor.9"
Second, claims splitting would allow a party to circumvent the
§ 1126(c) confirmation and voting procedures by increasing the
total number of creditors in a class.99
The Ionosphere court's fears were misguided. First, claims
based on publicly traded instruments can be split, affecting
voting rights under § 1126(c).' ° The court's concern that
claims splitting allows circumvention of § 1126(c) is thus less
relevant, since such activity takes place anyway. Second, there
is no evidence to support the contention that the debtor's bur-
den would be significantly increased.'0 ' Moreover, any added
burden would be outweighed by the benefits derived from the
resulting increase in activity. A claims purchaser would be
more willing to buy a claim if it is able to take only the uncon-
tested portion of the claim.0 2 The seller of the claim would be
better off because it could keep the questionable portion of a
claim which, due to informational advantages, would be worth
more to the seller than any third party would be willing to
pay.'O3 The seller can thus sell off that part of the claim that
has a reasonable market value while keeping the portion which
would be undervalued by the market. In addition, a seller of a
large claim may have difficulty finding a single buyer. Thus
claims splitting makes large claims more marketable.' 4
The effectiveness of the 1991 amendments to Rule 3001(e)
is neverthelss limited because the new Rule applies only to
certain types of claims. The final sentence of the advisory
committee's notes indicates that a distinction will be drawn
between claims subject to nonbankruptcy regulation and those
that are not: "This rule is not intended ... to affect remedies
otherwise available under nonbankruptcy law to a transferor or
transferee such as for misrepresentation in connection with the
9 8 Id. at 444.
11 Id. Section 1126(c) requires the approval of two-thirds in amount and a
majority in number of all claims in order for a plan to be accepted. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1126(c) (1988).
100 1992 Developments, supra note 8, at 513.
191Id. at 514.
102 Id. at 512.
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transfer of a claim."'1 5  Thus, the rule preserves rights the
transferor or transferee may have under contract or securities
laws. The rationale for distinguishing claims based on the
applicability of securities laws is far from clear and serves only
as an additional source of confusion.
0 6
C. ALTERNATIVE CODE PROVISIONS
While the new Rule 3001(e) precludes courts from using it
as a basis for regulation of claims trading, courts can still use
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code to regulate claims trad-
ing. These sections include: § 105,1°7 concerning general eq-
uitable powers; § 1125(b),"' concerning solicitation of votes;
and § 1126(e),'1 9  concerning good faith requirements."'
Courts may also use pre-Code common law precedent to justify
intervention."'
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the court the
general equitable power to issue any order that is necessary or
appropriate to administer the Chapter 11 estate. 112  The
court's potential power under § 105 is very broad:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of this title. No provision of this title providing
for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall
be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte,
taking any action or making any determination neces-
sary or appropriate to enforce or implement court
orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process."'
105 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) advisory committee's note (Supp. IV 1992).
16 As discussed infra Part V, the distinction between claims based on
securities and those based on trade claims is illogical.
107 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
108 Id. § 1125(b).
109 Id. § 1126(e).
110 In re Pleasant Hill Partners, 163 B.R. 388, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
... Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
112 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
113 Id.
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Courts have, however, interpreted this provision as applicable
only in conjunction with another Code section." A court
could use this broad equitable power in conjunction with the
Code's policy of fairness and equitable distribution among
creditors to examine claims trading."5
Some courts have invoked § 1125(b) to regulate claims
trading." 6 Section 1125(b) creates disclosure requirements for
parties who solicit votes for or against a bankruptcy plan."7
Courts have equated claims trading with soliciting votes be-
cause the buyer of a claim also buys the votes that it repre-
sents.""
A third provision used to seek court intervention is the good
faith provision of § 1126(e)." 9 The 1991 amendments to Rule
3001(e) make use of this provision more difficult because it no
longer requires the parties to disclose the terms of the transfer.
This lack of information makes monitoring for good faith more
difficult.
Another possible road to regulation is through Bankruptcy
Rule 2019. Subsection 2019(b)(2) states that the court may
"examine... any claim or interest acquired by any entity or
committee in contemplation or in the course of a case under the
Code and grant appropriate relief.''120  Although this rule
mainly applies to fiduciary trading, some contend that it could
114 Pleasant Hill, 163 B.R. at 391 n.6 (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ablers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988)). In Norwest, the Supreme Court stated that
"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can
only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." 485 U.S. at
206.
115 See Conti, supra note 7, at 309; see also supra text accompanying note
12.
1. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
117 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988).
11 In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 295 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In
re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1, 2-3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Contra In re Pleasant Hill Partners, 163 B.R. 388, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994)
(refusing to consider the purchase of claims solicitation under § 1125(b)).
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988); Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 289. For a full
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 142-145. Section 1126(e) allows
a court, after notice and hearing to "designate any entity whose acceptance or
rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in
good faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title."
120 11 U.S.C. § 2019(b)(2) (1988).
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be construed to allow courts to regulate all claims trading.1
21
To date, no court has used this Rule as authority for its action.
D. REGULATION IN THE COURTROOM
Courts have struggled for some time with their role in the
regulation of claims trading. Some courts have taken an active
role, reading the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to permit, or even
require, their active supervision and regulation of this pro-
cess. 2 2 The central theme in these opinions is the lack of
disclosure taking place in the claims trading process and the
resulting abuse. This lack of disclosure causes bankruptcy
courts to take an active role in three areas: (1) where the claims
purchaser looks for control; (2) where the claims seller appears
to be unsophisticated and susceptible to abuse; and (3) where
there appears to be bad faith on the part of the claims purchas-
er. One common result of the courts' action in these cases is
distress in the legal and investment communities. Concerned
parties feel uncertain about how courts will react to claims
trading and see no clear guidance on how to plan their activi-
ties.
1. The Unsophisticated Claim Seller: Revere Copper
123
In Revere Copper, Phoenix Capital Corporation solicited
claims from creditors at twenty percent of their face value from
November 5, until December 6, 1984.124 On November 30,
however, the Wall Street Journal reported that under a poten-
tial plan proposed by the debtor, claimants would receive sixty-
five percent of the face value of their claims.15 In accordance
with former Rule 3001(e)(2), Phoenix sought court approval of
the purchase. The court refused to approve the transfer of
claims.
12 6
121 See Lurey & Ryan, supra note 8, at 754-55.
122 See Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 301-03 (the court has "'ample power' to
formulate appropriate remedies"); In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 B.R.
1, 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2) permits
the court to order substitution where appropriate after a hearing).
12 In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
124 Id. at 1-2.
125 Id. at 2.
126 Id. at 3. Phoenix was required to get court approval of its claim
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The court looked to the advisory committee notes of the
former Rule 3001(e) as justification for its action." 7 It wor-
ried that "solicited creditors may be unaware of their rights and
options and fall prey to the belief that the bankruptcy inevitably
will result in their receiving the proverbial ten cents on the
dollar or worse."'28 It then examined § 1125 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, which prohibits solicitation of votes in connection with
a filed plan unless the solicitation is accompanied or preceded
by a disclosure statement.129 Since Phoenix did not provide
the assignors with sufficient information, the court ordered that
none of the assignments be approved until the creditors had
been given thirty days to revoke their assignments. 3 ° It also
ordered Phoenix to provide any future assignors with a disclo-
sure statement.'
3 '
The court was concerned with protecting unsophisticated
creditors. It wanted creditors to be "plainly advised of their
options.' 13 2  However noble its concern may be, the court
should ensure a level playing field only, not protect parties from
their own ignorance. The court could have set a good precedent
by barring only the trades that took place before the article
disclosed the predicted value of the claims. By placing an
affirmative duty on the purchaser to provide information to
creditors, even though the information was available to even a
minimally concerned creditor, the court lost sight of the ratio-
nale for regulating claims.
purchase because it was buying trade claims. If it had bought claims based on
a bond or debenture, it could have avoided the application of Rule 3001(e)(2),
and the case never would have come before the court. See supra text accompa-
nying note 105.
127 The court cited the advisory committee note to former Rule 3001(e),
which states that requiring disclosure of the consideration "will assist the
court in dealing with evils that may arise out of post-bankruptcy traffic in
claims against an estate." Revere Copper, 58 B.R. at 2 (quoting 11 U.S.C. app.
Rule 3001(e) advisory committee's note).
128 Revere Copper, 58 B.R. at 2.
' Id. at 2-3. The court went on to describe the type of disclosure required:
"[t]he disclosure statement must contain adequate information which means
information of a kind and in sufficient detail to enable a hypothetical reason-
able investor typical of holders of claims to make an informed judgment about
the plan." Id. at 3 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)).
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2. Control and Bad Faith: Allegheny 3
In December of 1989, Allegheny International ("Allegheny")
filed its plan for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.13 After the expiration of the period in which the
debtor had an exclusive right to file a plan, Japonica Partners
("Japonica"), an investment group seeking control of Allegheny,
purchased subordinated debentures of Allegheny with a face
value of $10,000 for $2,712 in order to qualify as a party in
interest and to file a plan of reorganization. 1 5 Japonica's plan
offered cash equivalents of $6.42 per share and gave Japonica
control of the debtor. 3 ' The debtor's plan offered $7.00 per
share of stock.
37
After the court approved the debtor's disclosure statement,
Japonica began acquiring claims held by secured bank lenders.
Eventually Japonica obtained enough claims to achieve a block-
ing position. 38 This ensured the defeat of the debtor's plan
and made confirmation of Japonica's own plan more likely.
Japonica bought most of these claims for eighty to eighty-five
percent of their face value." 9 It paid ninety-five percent of
the face value for the claim that gave it a blocking position.
140
The debtor moved to have Japonica's votes disqualified as cast
in bad faith under § 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.'
4 '
' In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
134 Id. at 286.
135 Id. at 286.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 286-87. A blocking position refers to the amount of claims owned
by a single claimant in any one class. Section 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that:
c) A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been
accepted by creditors, other that any entity designated under
subsection (e) of this section, that hold at least two-thirds in amount
and more than one half in number of the allowed claims of such
class held by creditors, other that any entity designated under
subsection (e) of this section, that have accepted or rejected such
plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988).
1 9 Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 287.
140 Id.
141 Id. (citing § 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows the court to
disqualify the ballot of "any entity whose acceptance or rejection... was not
1994]
The court found that Japonica had violated § 1126(e) of the
Bankruptcy Code by acting in bad faith. 4 2 Because good faith
is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the court looked to § 203
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and case law interpreting this
section.4 3  The finding of bad faith was based on several
actions by Japonica. First, the court found that Japonica did
not file its plan until the "eleventh hour.""' Second, Japonica
did not purchase significant claims in the debtor until the
voting period, at which time Japonica was a proponent of a
plan. 45 The court also decided that Japonica's status as a
plan proponent made it an insider and therefore subject to
fiduciary duties.'46 Japonica had also solicited claims both
before and after approval of its disclosure statement.'47
The court found that Japonica's solicitation of claims was
equivalent to soliciting votes in favor of its plan. 4 s A creditor
cannot solicit votes before approval of its disclosure state-
ment. 4 9 The court was disturbed by the fact that allowing
Japonica to solicit claims would basically allow them to buy
votes since they would vote the claims purchased in favor of
their plan. Debtors, however, are not allowed to solicit votes
until a disclosure statement is filed so that claim holders are
informed when they vote. Thus, Japonica was doing something
the debtor itself was prohibited from doing.
The court then focused on the manner in which Japonica
acquired its claims. First, the court noted that the way that
Japonica acquired claims was discriminatory because it treated
people in the same class differently.5 0 Second, the court
in good faith or was not solicited or procured in good faith").
142 Id. at 289.
14 3 Id. at 287-89 (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 203 (repealed effective
Oct. 1, 1979)).
144 Id. at 289.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 299.
14 7 Id.
148 Id. at 295.
149 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988). Section 1125(b) requires that a plan
proponent not solicit acceptance until the court approves its disclosure
statement. Id.
150 Those that accepted Japonica's offer received immediate cash; those that
did not had to wait for the reorganization plan. Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 296-97.
Section 1123(a)(4) requires that any plan of reorganization treat each claim or
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inferred that Japonica acted in bad faith, noting that Japonica
acquired a blocking position in the most senior class (making
confirmation difficult without its vote). In making this finding,
-the court asserted that Japonica's purpose in purchasing claims
was to assert control over the debtor, rather than to further its
interests as a member of a class. By inferring an intent equiva-
lent to bad faith, the court exercised a great deal of discretion.
The court disqualified the votes cast by Japonica as cast in bad
faith.
151
The court's decision in Allegheny has been contro-
versial."2 On one hand, it has caused distress among practi-
tioners about how to trade in bankruptcy claims without run-
ning violating the Bankruptcy Code. On the other, it demon-
strates how far courts will go to stretch the provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code to regulate claims trading. For example,
there is no authority in the Code for the court to equate solici-
tation of claims with solicitation of votes. There is no authority
to support the court's finding that Japonica was an insider due
to its status as a plan proponent. The court wholly ignored the
positive effects of claims trading, focusing instead on the abuses.
interest of a particular class the same. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1988).
"'Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 290. An even harsher result was reached in In
re Chateaugay, 86 B 11270 slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1988), cited in
Mayerson et al., supra note 1, at 641. In that case, Regal formed a shell
corporation to acquire unsecured claims against a Chapter 11 debtor. Id.
Regal intended to acquire control of the debtor and propose a 100% payment
plan. Id. Although Regal took no action to hide its intentions, it failed to
disclose its intentions to the creditors. Id. Regal offered 33% of the face value
for unsecured claims, and procured claims from over 450 creditors. Id. The
Chateaugay court, following the court in Revere Copper, found that the
inadequate disclosure invalidated the claims trades. Id. Viewing Regal's
actions as intentional omissions, the court refused to effect the assignment of
claims. Id. at 640. Moreover, the court refused to cancel the assignments,
leaving Regal to seek refunds from the holders of the unsecured claims. Id. at
641.
As in Revere Copper and Allegheny, the Chateaugay court went beyond
all authority in the Bankruptcy Code, diminishing the power of the legitimate
argument for some regulation of claims trading.
152 See Trading Claims, supra note 1; Minkel & Baker, supra note 1, at 74-
101; Caplan, supra note 7, at 1063-65; Charles, supra note 8, at 275-77, 303-
04; Millstein & Siegel, supra note 8, at 404; Neely, supra note 8, at 156-60;
White, supra note 8, at 36-38; Skeel, supra note 8, at 513-15; Sabin et al.,
supra note 7; Lurey & Ryan, supra note 8, at 768-69; Africk, supra note 7, at
1413-16; Mayerson et al., supra note 1, at 655-56.
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The Allegheny court's hostility towards claims trading arises
from the lack of disclosure. If Japonica had provided disclosure
similar to that required of debtors, the court would have had
difficulty finding bad faith. The court was also concerned that
creditors who accepted Japonica's offer would be treated differ-
ently from those who did not. This difference in treatment will
occur in most claims trading situations. Creditors, however,
should have the opportunity to choose between selling their
claims for less money now or waiting out the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in an attempt to receive more. As long as there is
adequate disclosure, no unfairness will result from allowing
creditors to choose between these two options.
3. Litigation Under Amended Rule 3001(e)
In response to the court's actions in Revere Copper and
Allegheny, Congress amended Rule 3001(e). As intended, the
amendments significantly reduced litigation over claims trading
and courts have removed themselves from the claims trading
process. As a result there is little case law on the amended
rule. Its effects have, however, been documented in some court
opinions.
a. Odd Lot Trading
153
Although decided prior to the effective date of the amend-
ment to Rule 3001(e), the court in Odd Lot Trading cited the
proposed amendments as some evidence of the purpose of the
rule. In this case, AMROC Investments, L.P., ("AMROC")
solicited claims from Odd Lot claim holders, enclosing three
pages from a thirty-two page disclosure statement. 54  The
three pages indicated that the proposed plan provided for
payment of $0.80 on the dollar while AMROC was offering
$0.60.155 The debtor objected to three assignments of claims,
and one assignor objected. The debtor asserted that it filed its
objections as a fiduciary and that it had a duty to be fair to all
constituents.'56  The debtors argued that the purpose of
§ 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code was to provide holders of
' In re Odd Lot Trading, Inc., 115 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
15 Id. at 98.
155 Id. at 99.
156 Id.
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claims with sufficient information to enable them to make
informed decisions and that these assignments violated the
spirit of the law.'57
The court, citing Rule 3001(e), stated that the Bankruptcy
Code does not address solicitation of claims.' It noted that
the proposed amendment to Rule 3001(e) was intended to lessen
the court's role in the claims trading process, which was ques-
tioned by the judges in Revere Copper and Allegheny.'59 The
court distinguished Revere Copper and Allegheny by emphasiz-
ing that AMROC provided "sufficient information and did not
mislead the assignors when soliciting to purchase claims."'6 °
b. SPM Manufacturing6'
In the SPM Manufacturing bankruptcy, the secured creditor
agreed with unsecured creditors to divide any money received
among themselves to the exclusion of other priority creditors.
This arrangment would have violated the absolute priority rule
because some unsecured creditors would receive partial payment
while other priority creditors would receive nothing.'62 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court
lacked equitable power to compel a secured creditor to pay an
unsecured creditor's portion over to the estate for distribution
according to priority. 63  In dicta, the court analogized the
agreement at issue in the case to a transfer under amended
Rule 3001(e).'" The court stated that the amendment was
intended to restrict the bankruptcy court's power to inspect the
terms of the transfer.165  As a consequence of the amended
rule, the court could disapprove a transfer of a claim if the
transfer involved a breach of fiduciary duty or fraud, but it
157 Id.
15 8 Id. at 100. The Court noted that § 1125(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
addresses solicitation of acceptance or rejection of plans of reorganizations, not
claims. Id.
159 Id. at 101.
1
60 Id.
161 In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
162 Id. at 1315.
1 Id. at 1318.
'6 Id. at 1314-15.
165 Id. at 1314.
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could no longer disapprove a transfer based on its terms.'66 If
the unsecured creditors had sold their claims to the secured
creditor, the result would be the same as in a transfer under
Rule 3001(e). The unsecured creditors would receive money,
and the priority claimants would not.'67 The court concluded
that it could not prohibit an agreement calling for a sharing of
claims when the same result could be accomplished by selling
the claims as authoroized by Rule 3001(e). 6 '
IV. REGULATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933169 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934170 in an attempt to regulate
the trading of securities in public markets. It sought to ensure
that the investing public received accurate information and that
rules were in place to protect investors from manipulation or
exploitation by those who possess control of or have access to
non-public information.' 7 ' The Acts accomplish these goals by
requiring the filing of disclosures with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC"), the agency charged with imple-
menting and enforcing these Acts. 172 For purposes of claims
trading, securities laws are relevant in two respects: (1) certain
provisions of the securities laws may apply to claims trading,
depending on the type of claim and the court's interpretation of
the Securities Acts; and (2) the policies underlying the develop-
ment of securities laws apply to claims trading.
166 Id. The terms of the transfer would include, for example, inadequate
consideration.
167 1d. at 1315.
168 Id.
169 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
170 Id. § 78.
17 George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. Bus.
117 (1964), reprinted in RIcHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOM-
ICS OF CORPORATION LAW & SECuRITIEs REGULATION 347 (1980) (noting that
the purpose of regulation in the securities market is to increase truth in the
world, to prevent or punish fraud, and to protect the innocent investor).
.72 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d, 14d, 14e (1993).
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A. WHAT IS A SECURITY?
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 apply to all securities.'73 If the instrument in ques-
tion is a security as defined by the Acts, then the Acts will
apply whether or not the company associated with the instru-
ments is in bankruptcy. 7 4 Defining the term security is the
threshold concern in determining the applicability of securities
laws.
Neither the Securities Act nor the Securities Exchange Act
includes a claim arising out of bankruptcy in its definition of a
security. 7 ' Although a claim is not listed in either definition,
the definitions are broadly written and have been interpreted
broadly by the courts. 7 ' In fact, the Supreme Court describes
the Securities Acts' definitions of securities as "sufficiently
broad to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold
as an investment."' 7  The broad reading given to these defini-
tions has not been extended to claims in bankruptcy. 78 The
173 The term "security" is broadly defined under both the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The 1933 Act defines a
security as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebt-
edness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
The 1934 Act is similarly broad. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
174 Section 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts the issuance of a debtor's
securities from federal and state registration requirements. 11 U.S.C. § 1145
(1988).
171 See id. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10).
176 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
177 Id.
178 In 1990, a spokesman for the SEC said that the SEC was monitoring
developments in claims trading. Franklin, supra note 77, at 5.
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Securities Act of 1933 comes closest by including "evidence of
indebtedness" in its definition of a security. 179  No court,
however, has held that a Chapter 11 claim qualifies as a securi-
ty under this definition. 8 °
Case law also fails to provide any clear definition of securi-
ty. The most relevant interpretation of the definition of a
security was provided by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst &
Young.' 8' In Reves, the Supreme Court adopted the "family
resemblance" test to distinguish between an investment and a
commercial note.'82  This test involved four factors: (1) the
buyer's and seller's general motivations, (2) the existence of an
active market for speculation or investment, (3) the investing
public's reasonable expectations, and (4) the presence of some
factor which reduces the risk of the instrument enough to make
the application of securities laws unnecessary. 83 Arguably, a
claim in bankruptcy satisfies the four factors. The Reves test,
however, may be limited to its facts. The court in Reves distin-
guished between commercial paper and notes.8 No court has
used the Reves test to call a trade claim a security.
85
Some commentators argue that the distinction between
securities and trade claims is nonsensical and should be aban-
doned in favor of uniform regulations.'86 In most Chapter 11
situations a claim is similar to a security (e.g. it represents the
right to receive a payment or an equity share in the reorganized
entity). 8 ' Accepting this view, securities laws appear to be an
179 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 48.
180 id.
181 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
182 Id. at 63 (citing Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126 (2d Cir. 1976)).
183 Id. at 66.
1
84 Id. at 60-67.
185 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 47.
188 For a comprehensive discussion of the application of securities laws to
bankruptcy claims, see Conti et al., supra note 7; James D. Prendergast,
Applying Federal Securities Law to the Trading of Bankruptcy Claims, 3
FAuLKNER & GRAYs BANKR. L. REv. 9 (1991). See also Anthony M. Sabino,
No Security in Bankruptcy: The Argument Against Applying the Federal
Securities Laws to the Trading of Claims in Bankruptcy, 23 PAcIFIC L.J. 109
(1992) (arguing that securities laws should not be applied to bankruptcy
claims).
187 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 32.
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effective vehicle with which to regulate claims trading as they
are well-established, widely known, and would result in more
uniformity than would the bankruptcy courts' use of its equita-
ble power under the Bankruptcy Code. Such a proposal would,
however, also subject claims trading to all the formal require-
ments of the securities laws such as disclosure and registration
statements.
In a related Allegheny case,' the bankruptcy court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania suggested a way to apply
securities regulation to claims trading. In this case, the court
likened the Chapter 11 filing to creating a market in nonpub-
licly traded securities. 189 The court was concerned that in this
"market" claimants are not protected by disclosure statements,
and the court expressly indicated its desire that Congress step
in to regulate the activity. 9 '
The Bankruptcy Code specifically exempts sales of securi-
ties under a reorganization plan from the requirements of the
Securities Acts.' 9 ' This creates an inference that Congress
intended to regulate bankruptcy separately. The policy consid-
erations involved in bankruptcy are special enough that they
are addressed by specific provisions in the Code. Claims trading
is no different, and thus warrants specific treatment in the
Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, application of securities laws to
claims in bankruptcy may cause havoc with the orderly admin-
istration of bankruptcy proceedings. This Note argues that
there are more efficient means of ensuring adequate disclosure;
specifically, the Bankruptcy Code itself should regulate claims
trading.
B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
Several considerations arise from claims regulated under
securities laws. The broadest implications for claims trading
arise from the antifraud provisions of § 10(b) of the Securities
Act and Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b). 92 Rule 10b-5
prohibits any untrue statement, omission of any material fact
necessary to make a statement not misleading, or any other
"s In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
' 89 Id. at 243.
190 
Id.
191 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988).
192 Trading Claims, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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deceptive, fraudulent or misleading practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
193
One difficulty with the non-applicability of the Securities
Acts to claims trading is the increased potential for insider
trading and other actions inconsistent with the policies of the
Securities Acts. Guarding against insider trading thus becomes
the responsibility of the bankruptcy court. Rule 3001(e), howev-
er, gives the bankruptcy court little authority and no informa-
tion with which to prevent such abuses. As Part V of this Note
discusses, disclosure is necessary to achieve fairness among all
parties involved in a bankruptcy.
In a non-bankruptcy situation, an entity purchasing stock
in a corporation to gain control of that corporation must comply
with Regulations 14E and 14D of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. Regulation 14D requires comprehensive disclosure
and filings with the SEC9 4 and Regulation 14E governs the
making of a tender offer. 9 ' If the purchaser intends to make
a tender offer, Regulation 13D is also applicable. Regulation
13D requires the purchaser to disclose its identity, how much of
the corporation it has acquired and for how much money, and
its intentions with respect to the corporation.' 96
In the bankruptcy context, a party can attempt to gain
control of a corporation by purchasing creditors' claims. Assum-
ing that the claims are not based on publicly traded instru-
ments, the claims purchaser avoids the reporting requirements
placed on a similarly situated person in a non-bankruptcy
context. 197  This contravenes the Securities Acts' policy to
protect investors. In the bankruptcy setting, it is the creditors
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
194 Id. §§ 240.14d-1 to 240.14d-103.
195 Id. §§ 240.14e-1 to 240.14e-6.
196 Id. §§ 240.13d-i to 240.13d-101.
197 A current example of this situation is the Federated Department Store
purchase of approximately $480,000,000 worth of claims in the Macy's Chapter
11 bankruptcy. Federated purchased this block of claims in an attempt to
force a merger with Macys, which wishes to remain independent. See Gavin
Power, Rival Buys a Piece of Macy's: Federated Stores Wants to Merge with
Retailer, S.F. CHRON., Jan 3, 1994, at Al (reporting on Federated's desire to
merge with Macy's after purchasing Macys claims); Patrick M. Reilly & Ellen
Shapiro, Federated Bidding for Macy Through Bankruptcy Court, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 3, 1994, at A3 (same); Stephanie Strom, Federated Acquires Stake in
Macy's in a Bold Move Toward Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at Al
(same).
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who need protection. Without some disclosure requirements,
these creditors will be reluctant to trade claims. Since claims
trading can be beneficial to all involved, this Note argues that
the Bankruptcy Code should encourage claims trading.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING CLAIMS TRADING
The lack of guidance under the present Bankruptcy Code
has created a great deal of uncertainty in the business commu-
nity as to when a court will involve itself in claims trading.
This uncertainty decreases efficiency by limiting market activi-
ty, increasing transaction costs, and placing unsophisticated
creditors at risk of being treated unfairly. Mayerson, Sarachek,
and Swersky state:
[B]uyers and sellers of claims still operate in an atmo-
sphere of uncertainty and must be prudent. Different
courts have taken different approaches to regulating
trading claims from benign neglect to activist interven-
tion, perhaps in violation of principles of the Bankrupt-
cy Code. One must, therefore, view the area of selling
claims as fraught with risks - both the risks inherent
in the nature of claims or the claimant-assignors them-
selves and the risk of whether a bankruptcy court will
validate the sale of the claim. These risks must be
taken into consideration in negotiating and pricing a
sale of claims. 9 '
Nevertheless, claims trading has become a billion dollar busi-
ness.'99 While functioning as an investment for claims pur-
chasers, claims trading enables creditors of Chapter 11 debtors
to convert their claims to cash. Clarification of the regulations
governing the process will improve both fairness and efficiency.
To promote an active market in claims trading, both bank-
ruptcy courts and creditors must be provided with information.
The principles of efficiency and fairness are best served by
requiring a threshold disclosure from all claims purchasers.
The bankruptcy judge's role should be limited to avoiding
arbitrary and inconsistent results. A "safe harbor" should
198 Mayerson et al., supra note 1, at 661.
... See id.
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protect those claims purchasers in compliance with the proposed
disclosure requirements.
The idea that claims trading is better left unregulated is
misguided. First, claims trading is already regulated in certain
circumstances. Rule 3001(e) applies only to claims "other than
those based on a publicly traded instrument.""0 Thus, if the
claim is based on a publicly traded instrument, the purchaser
and seller will have to meet the disclosure requirements of all
applicable securities laws. Trading in other types of claims is
not subject to similar disclosure requirements. No logical
rationale exists for this distinction.
Second, the amended Rule 3001(e) will not prevent the
courts from becoming involved in the claims trading pro-
cess.2' Even if courts attempt to stay out of the process,
interested parties will continue to search the Bankruptcy Code
for new ways to initiate court intervention on their behalf.
Bankruptcy courts have broad equitable powers under § 105 of
the Code, 0 2 and nothing in Rule 3001(e) prevents courts from
intervening in claims trading under §§ 1126(e), 1125(b), or Rule
2019(b).20 3
The Bankruptcy Code's failure to adequately address claims
trading has led bankruptcy courts to regulate in an ad hoc
manner, with the tolerance for claims trading dependent upon
the jurisdiction and presiding judge.2 4 The new Rule 3001(e),
which lessens the courts' involvement in the claims trading
process, exacerbates the problem. While Rule 3001(e) was
amended in an attempt to gain greater uniformity across juris-
dictions and to facilitate claims trading, it eliminates whatever
200 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
203 See discussion supra Parts III.B and III.C. Courts can still use these
provisions to justify intervention, depending on the ingenuity of counsel.
Minkel and Baker note that
The Bankruptcy Code is silent on the question of claims trading.
When new issues and problems arise in a bankruptcy case, the first
impulse may be to parse through the Bankruptcy Code and Bank-
ruptcy Rules to find a hook on which a bankruptcy court can hang
an equitable remedy. In doing so, a number of courts seem to have
made a policy decision about the wisdom of claims trading. But
policy decisions are for Congress, not the courts, to make.
Minkel & Baker, supra note 1, at 101.
204 See discussion supra Part III.
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protection was previously available, and it is unclear whether
the change will actually result in greater uniformity or efficien-
A. THE NEED FOR DISCLOSURE
Contrary to its intended effect of increasing the efficiency of
the market, the lack of adequate disclosure under the amended
Rule 3001(e) impairs the claims market. In order to create an
efficient market, disclosure of the terms of claims trades, as well
as the true identity and interests of buyers, must be required.
Without disclosure of the prices of previous trades, creditors will
not have good information regarding the values of their claims
and will therefore be reluctant to sell. Without disclosure of the
true identity of a claims purchaser (not just the nominal pur-
chaser as is currently required), these purchasers may use
fronts and confidentiality agreements to depress prices. °6
The present Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide
specific guidelines for claims trading. To allow activity on this
scale without providing guidance as to how the activity should
take place invites inequity and manipulation. As with securi-
ties, the most efficient means of regulating claims trading is by
ensuring that there is adequate disclosure. Simple regulations
regarding disclosure by parties involved would go a long way
towards creating efficient and equitable markets for claims
trading.
The benefits of disclosure would outweigh the costs. Re-
quiring disclosure would reduce litigation and lower transaction
costs. The costs of providing information and monitoring disclo-
sure would be limited. °7 Moreover, a mandatory disclosure
205 Another effect of the amendments to Rule 3001(e) is that vote buying
becomes a greater concern. Conti, supra note 7, at 309. The pre-1991 version
of Rule 3001(e) required not only that the terms of a transfer be disclosed to
the court but also that the transfer be unconditional. 11 U.S.C. app. Rule
3001(e) (1988) (repealed effective Aug. 1, 1991). These requirements limited
vote buying arrangements in which a claims purchaser bought bankruptcy
claims on the condition that the purchaser's reorganization plan was con-
firmed. Conti, supra note 7, at 307. The amended Rule 3001(e), however,
neither requires disclosure nor that the transfer be unconditional. See 11
U.S.C. app. Rule 3001(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2 0 Conti, supra note 7, at 304-05.
207 The information costs are limited to providing the court with notice of
the trade and its terms. Monitoring costs would also be minimal because the
safe harbor proposed by this Note provides a self-enforcing mechanism. It is
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rule would promote efficiency in the claims trading market.
Evidence from trading in bonds, which are subject to the disclo-
sure rules of the Securities Acts, indicates that the market is
efficient at pricing these investments during the pendency of a
bankruptcy. °8 With adequate information, the value of the
failed entity is maximized. Creditors wishing to participate in
the reorganization to gain control of the debtor or to maximize
the value of their investment may do so. Those creditors wish-
ing to receive cash for their claim may do so.
Disclosure regulations should consider the motive of the
purchaser.2"9 The claims purchaser's motives are not always
apparent, and its intentions may change over time. These
practical problems, however, do not differ in any material
respect from those encountered in securities regulation. It may
be necessary to require disclosure if a claims purchaser owns
more than a certain percentage of the face value of claims
owned, similar to the five percent figure used for tender offers
under the Securities and Exchange Act.
210
B. A SAFE HARBOR
Balancing fairness and efficiency in claims trading is
difficult. On one hand, claims trading should be encouraged by
allowing the market to operate with no interference. On the
other, the trading process should be fair to all parties involved.
To balance these competing interests, this Note proposes requir-
ing disclosure of the parties in interest and the consideration
paid for a claim, while at the same time prohibiting any further
court intervention in the claims trading process. Contrary to
what some have proposed,2 n the disclosure called for should
not be coupled with court intervention in the claims trading
process. Rather, a "safe harbor" should be created for the
in the purchaser's interest to provid full and accurate disclosure to obtain the
benefits of the safe harbor. See discussion infra Part V.B.
208 Allan C. Eberhart & Richard J. Sweeney, Does the Bond Market Predict
Bankruptcy Settlements?, 47 J. FIN. 943 (1992).
209 For example, a disclosure rule might require a purchaser who has
acquired a significant portion of a class of claims to disclose her percent share
of the class as well as whether she intends to use her purchases to gain
control of the debtor.
20 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1988)).
211 See Conti et al., supra note 7.
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claims purchaser. As long as the claims purchaser complies
with disclosure requirements, the court would not be allowed to
intervene in the transaction.
This proposal would require sending notice to all creditors
that a secondary market in claims may be created.212 The
notice would explain that upon the transfer of any claim, notice
must be given to the court disclosing the actual purchaser and
seller as well as the consideration given for the claim.213 This
information would be available to interested parties and to the
public. Creditors could use the information to discover the
market price for comparable claims. Trade creditors, who
currently cannot reliably determine the value of their claims,
could use price information to prevent overreaching by more
sophisticated parties. This provision would ensure a level
playing field while preventing the court from intervening in an
efficient marketplace.
A second aspect of this proposal would require any party
that acquires a predetermined level214 of the claims of the
bankrupt estate in any specific class to file a separate notice
identifying itself and declaring its intentions. Such notice would
be available to all interested parties. Full disclosure by parties
accumulating a position in claims will further aid potential
sellers in fairly pricing their claims.215
212 This notice could simply be added to the notice given when the creditors
are initially contacted regarding the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
2' This notice provision would also require insiders to declare their
position to the seller.
214 This level, perhaps 5%, could be uniform for all bankruptcies or set by
the court after classes of claims are created.
215 For disclosure purposes, there is no reason to treat a claim based on a
security differently from one based on a trade creditor's claim. For many
investors, claims, like securities, are just another investment vehicle. The
rationale for disclosure under securities laws thus applies to claims trading.
The current Bankruptcy Code and the 1991 amendments to Rule 3001(e) do
not recognize this reality.
Although the same disclosure policy underlies all claims, this Note argues
that the disclosure requirements for claims trading should be part of the rules
regulating bankruptcy. It is clear that Congress intended bankruptcy to
operate independently of the securities laws. See discussion supra text
accompanying note 191. Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to assume that
securities rules as they stand should apply to claims in bankruptcy. The
securities laws were structured to operate in a completely different environ-
ment. The rules governing bankruptcy differ dramatically from those that
govern a going concern. More important, the SEC lacks the expertise to
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Claims trading is a desirable activity, but this proposal
acknowledges that, even with disclosure, abuse is possible.216
This Note argues that the benefits derived from a free and
efficient claims trading market outweigh the small amount of
abuse that some parties may attempt. On balance, creditors
will benefit from both the active market and the information
provided by the disclosure requirement. Therefore, under this
proposal, if adequate disclosure is provided, an irrebuttable
presumption of validity will attach to the trade. If, however, the
parties fail to provide the notice and disclosure required by this
proposal, the bankruptcy court would be free to use its general
equitable power under § 105 to examine the trade.217 The
threat of such intervention by courts will serve as a self-enforc-
ing mechanism, encouraging parties to comply to gain the
benefit of the safe harbor.
This proposal will give notice to all parties that information
regarding the value of claims is available and will allow parties
to engage in this activity without the fear of court intervention.
Without a safe harbor provision, the validity of a claim transfer
would depend on the individual bankruptcy judge's view of what
constitutes fairness or overreaching by a party, both subjective
determinations, making it impossible for parties to predict the
consequences of their activity.
CONCLUSION
Claims trading is big business, and all indications show
that it will continue to grow in the future. It serves a useful
function in the bankruptcy process, providing a liquid market
for claims and, in many cases, speeding up the bankruptcy
process. The importance of claims trading makes it imperative
that it be regulated under the Bankruptcy Code. Fundamental
to such guidance is the need for disclosure to ensure that all
parties in the process have access to relevant information.
Parties must know the circumstances under which court in-
regulate activities of a firm in bankruptcy.
"' See In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985). For discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying note 123. The
disclosure will be of little help to the first creditor to sell a claim. However, an
efficient market would quickly correct for this problem, making disclosure
beneficial on the whole.
217 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 112-115.
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volvement will occur so that they may predict the outcome of
their actions. Unless such regulation is imposed, courts will
continue to apply the present Code inconsistently and inequita-
bly. The result of such action can only be an increase in uncer-
tainty in the financial markets and a decrease in claims trading.
Trading claims is a productive activity and should not be
subject to fear and risk due to the uncertainty of court interven-
tion. The proposal for disclosure coupled with a safe harbor
provision provides parties with the necessary information to
engage in claims trading with predictability. Society would be
better served by clearly defined rules that lay out disclosure
requirements but provide a "safe harbor" free of court interven-
tion for a trade that meets these requirements.
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